tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9215117687149149963.post1040200137363554236..comments2023-10-31T05:06:08.839-07:00Comments on Reality Apologetics: Some Normative EpistemologyJonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09594949524027204661noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9215117687149149963.post-55931114631918201502008-07-24T10:10:00.000-07:002008-07-24T10:10:00.000-07:00Commenting on this and the newer blog, I wonder wh...Commenting on this and the newer blog, I wonder what happens with "descriptive ethics." My own start in philosophy was as a freshman taking "Ethics." I was a very guilty child (ex-catholic) who sincerely and desparately wanted to know what I should be doing. The Catholics had blown their authority to me. But it still seemed possible I just needed to go to some other smart rigorous thinkers to get the answers I needed. <BR/><BR/>I was wonderfully disappointed, although it certainly did not seem wonderful at the time. All theories of ethics struck me as "geometry," if you bought the assumptions then you could derive the rest, but no one was going to tell you why you had to buy the assumptions. I loved Descartes (who I didn't seriously learn until Junior year) because he actually cared about the assumptions. "I think..." how can you deny it? I knew I couldn't and read on avidly as here was something beyond geometry!<BR/><BR/>Descriptive ethics, you may wind up being able to tell us a lot about Why people think they should do various things. But will you ever be able to tell us Why we should do those various things? If you come up with an ethics that seems to fit human minds, all you can do is describe, not prescribe. <BR/><BR/>Since my freshman year I have been largely morally adrift. Very aware that whatever I DECIDED was right and wrong was just no more than a decision. That if I imposed my decision on others (and a moral system which can't be imposed on others is pointless) that, really, I had no more justification than "because I think so." <BR/><BR/>I liked utilitarian approaches, because even though it is still just axiomatic (we just assume "greatest good for greatest number" and prove theorems from there), at least it is an attractive axiom. <BR/><BR/>Have a good one,<BR/>Mike<BR/><BR/>PS I have visited friends in Lancaster hundreds of times. My bud got his chemistry degree from F&M.RaplhCramdenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02582705522624090052noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9215117687149149963.post-18110697220603956132008-07-20T10:24:00.000-07:002008-07-20T10:24:00.000-07:00It's interesting that you bring up Zen, Mike, as I...It's interesting that you bring up Zen, Mike, as I've had some of the same thoughts. When I was younger--high school, before I got into philosophy seriously--I was very interested in Buddhism in general and Zen in particular. While I think rigorous analytic philosophy has more to offer in terms of likelihood of uncovering truth, there's still something to be said for Zen. Before I dropped Ethics as a specialty in favor of mind, I was working on a "disjunctive" normative theory, arguing something similar to what I'm arguing epistemically here--that is, that it doesn't make sense to have a single ethical theory about every situation, but rather to have a number of more general heuristics that help you gauge various aspects of a given situation and act accordingly. I think there's definitely something to it.<BR/><BR/>Thanks for all the kind words, and glad you like the blog!Jonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09594949524027204661noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9215117687149149963.post-15418207714177638072008-07-20T07:48:00.000-07:002008-07-20T07:48:00.000-07:00There are many tendencies that lead towards wrong ...There are many tendencies that lead towards wrong answers, and I doubt I'll get to even all the ones I know about in these comments. <BR/><BR/>But there is another one which I think is so powerful that it deserves a comment. <BR/><BR/>We tend to go with the crowd. Even those of us who think we don't go with the crowd usually just go with a different subcrowd which identifies itself with its "independence" from the main crowd. <BR/><BR/>Of course going with the crowd is USUALLY right. And this is at least part of what is tricky about the tendency. <BR/><BR/>I am toying with the policy of NOT firming up my beliefs one way or another, essentially making them only as firm as they need to be and no firmer. Interstingly, I think this is quite consistent with the idea of "presence" that is so appealing Buddhism, especially Zen. The experience itself is primary, beliefs are a method for making an actionable model. But that it is a model best not forgotten, the thing you are modeling, which is ultimately your present experiences, is best kept primary to the model. <BR/><BR/>I also think there is great value in avoiding being dismissive of people with whom I disagree. Especially given my "model" view of beliefs, basically everybody who is at all effective in life can be inferred to have a useful model, i.e. a useful set of beliefs. Working to understand how their beliefs are useful (rather than how they are wrong) makes me more effective in life, it seems to me. This also to me seems related somehow to a Zen approach, but I am weaker making that connection. <BR/><BR/>Cheers,<BR/>MikeRaplhCramdenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02582705522624090052noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9215117687149149963.post-5367146513745050012008-07-20T07:33:00.000-07:002008-07-20T07:33:00.000-07:00Absolutely you ought to be more skeptical of hypot...Absolutely you ought to be more skeptical of hypotheses you want to be true! If you are an experimentalist, you can set up an experiment to prove that you will more easily conclude something false is true if you want the thing to be true (and vice versa I'm sure). <BR/><BR/>One of the smartest men in the world is Charlie Munger, 2nd in command to Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway. His friends have a compiled a book "Poor Charlie's Almanack." In it, especially in an essay near the end, he compiles and explains a list of tendencies in thinking that you have to watch out for if you want the truth. I think it would be fantastic for philosophy if someone started linking that kind of thing in to epistemology and perhaps even metaphysics and ethics (using logic of course, we wouldn't want to leave out any useful categories). <BR/><BR/>There are other great books about defects in thinking. "Black Swans" by Nassim comes to mind. This comes from the world of investing, especially quant investing. But it certainly addresses a lot of beliefs from outside investing. It dives deep into the questions "what can we know and why do we keep making these other mistakes about that over and over and how can we stop." <BR/><BR/>Great blog entry and great blog. I look forward to your eventual books. If you have something written already and want a free proofreader (or even just an early fan) I would love to read your stuff. <BR/><BR/>MikeRaplhCramdenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02582705522624090052noreply@blogger.com